Russia-Georgia

For months, Moscow's successive provocations in Georgia have left observers suspecting that it was provoking a war in the Caucasus. It seems to have finally gotten what it wanted. The Kremlin's blatant aggression puts at stake not only the future of the most progressive state in the former Soviet Union, but the broader cause of European security.
In recent years, the Kremlin had escalated its interference in Georgia's territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia - bombing Georgian territory twice last year, illegally extending Russian citizenship to residents there, and appointing Russian security officers to their self-declared governments. South Ossetia's government in particular is practically under Moscow's direct control, with little if any ability to act independently.
But this flare-up is a direct consequence of Russia's deliberate and recent efforts to engage its small neighbor in military conflict. In April, Russia's President Vladimir Putin signed a decree effectively beginning to treat Abkhazia and South Ossetia as parts of the Russian Federation. This land grab was a particularly galling move because Russia is in charge of both the peacekeeping operations in the conflict zones, and the negotiations over their political resolution. The mediator had now clearly become a direct party to the conflict.
Moscow then sent paratroopers, heavy weapons and other troops into Abkhazia. Although these measures constituted military occupation of Georgian territory, Georgia failed to respond militarily. Instead, with European aspirations in mind, Georgian leaders listened to western calls for restraint, and put their faith in half-hearted western diplomatic initiatives.
Having failed to provoke Georgia to a war in Abkhazia, the Kremlin then tried in South Ossetia. Its proxies, the Ossetian separatist forces, escalated their attacks on Georgian posts and villages, making a response inevitable. Predictably, Moscow claimed a right to intervene, pouring Russian tanks into the area and bombing Georgian territory - including the country's capital. But why would Russia seek a war in the Caucasus, and why does it matter?
Georgia's position astride the western access route to the Caspian sea's energy reserves and Central Asia give it geopolitical significance. Moreover, Georgia represents exactly what Moscow does not want to see on its borders: a country both independent and increasingly democratic. Moscow instead seeks submission, preferably by authoritarian rulers that it can manipulate.
Yet the decisive factor was Georgia's efforts to gain Nato membership, a move in tune with the country's progress in consolidating democratic rule. Angela Merkel's statement that a country with unresolved conflicts can't enter Nato helped, too: it sent Russia a signal that it could prevent Georgia's Nato membership simply by stirring conflict.
Moscow's military adventure has far-reaching implications. To leaders in Ukraine and the Baltic states, it sends signals that it seeks to re-establish control in the former Soviet space. Probably correctly, leaders there assume they are next in line. More deeply, Russia's land grab threatens to return parts of Europe to the politics of territorial control of previous generations, negating the promise of integration and cooperation that the EU represents.
Russia's behaviour is incompatible with its aspirations to be a respected world power. Indeed, thoughtful people will find parallels between this and earlier incidents of Russian land seizures when it thought people were looking elsewhere. – the Baltic crisis of 1939, Finland, and post-second world war Iran come to mind. With most western leaders at the Olympics or on holiday, Moscow's efforts to establish a fait accompli in the Caucasus cannot be allowed to stand.
So far, the West's reaction has been inadequate. Rather than standing up for their own principles, western leaders think they can improve Russia's behaviour by appeasement, fearful of threatening relations with an undeniably powerful Russia. But by doing so, western leaders have unwittingly encouraged the most irresponsible elements in Moscow, whetting the hardliners' imperial appetites by not attaching any costs to their excesses. That in turn inexorably leads to a worsening of Russia's relations with the West.
Paradoxically, standing up to Moscow is not only the right thing to do in this crisis, but the best way to improve relations with Russia in the long term. For only a Russia that abandons its imperial agenda and respects its neighbors, irrespective of size, can be a true partner for the west.
It is now important for western leaders to realise that their silence so far has only encouraged Moscow's aggressive behaviour, and that they must now stand in solidarity with Georgia – in deeds, not only in words. Whether they do so will determine the future not only of the Caucasus, but also for Europe's security.
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Svante Cornell: The EU and the US should back Georgia against Russia's war-mongeringThis article was first published on guardian.co.uk on Friday August 08 2008. It was last updated at 19:29 on August 08 2008.